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Abstract — Recent studies have shown that slight perturbations 
in the input data can significantly affect the robustness of Deep 
Neural Networks (DNNs), leading to misclassification and 
confidence reduction. In this paper, we introduce a novel technique 
based on the Selective Sobel Convolution (SSC) operation in the 
training loop, that increases the robustness of a given DNN by 
allowing it to learn important edges in the input in a controlled 
fashion. This is achieved by introducing a trainable parameter, 
which acts as a threshold for eliminating the weaker edges. We 
validate our technique against the attacks of Cleverhans library on 
Convolutional DNNs against adversarial attacks. Our experimental 
results on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets illustrate that this 
controlled learning considerably increases the accuracy of the DNNs 
by 1.53% even when subjected to adversarial attacks.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are now being seen as a general 
solution to the problems requiring analysis and understanding 
of enormous datasets, i.e., autonomous vehicles, medical care, 
management problems [16], etc. However, DNNs have been 
found to be vulnerable to the specially-crafted inputs, known as 
adversarial inputs that fool their originally intended 
functionality. Recent studies [8] prove the existence of such 
adversarial examples in real world. 
Several defense mechanisms against the adversarial attacks, 
like adversarial training [9] [12] and DNN masking [13] [17], 
have been proposed. In doing so, either the DNN structure is 
changed, or it is trained against the known adversarial 
vulnerabilities, which limits their defense scope to known 
vulnerabilities. Moreover, several counter-attacks have 
proposed to neutralize these defense mechanisms [5] [15] [1]. 
Therefore, a more flexible and comprehensive defense 
strategy is required that can reduce the imperceptibility to 
make it detectable.   
A. Motivational Analysis 
Increasing the robustness of the DNNs using filtered inputs has 
emerged as one of the prime solutions to address the adversarial 
examples [11] [12]. Such techniques have been shown to be 
easily countered by introducing the noise in the input image that 
passes unfiltered through the filtering process [1]. Keeping in 
view the limitations of these existing static noise filters, we 
present a dynamic filter in the form of a convolutional layer 
that feeds controlled inputs to the DNN. The minimal 
adversarial perturbation introduced by the JSMA attack for a 
simply trained CNN and a CNN trained on controlled inputs is 
shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1: Comparison of the perturbations for the DNN trained in an 
uncontrolled environment (above) vs. the same DNN trained in a 
controlled environment (below). 
It can be observed that the adversarial example generated for 
the CNN trained on controlled inputs is more perceptible than 
that for the conventional CNN. 
B. Associated Research Challenges 
1. How to reduce the imperceptibility of the adversarial 
examples? 
2. How to perform Controlled Training, i.e., forcing the 
DNN to intelligently concentrate on some parts of the 
input and ignore others. 
C. Novel Contribution 
To address the above-mentioned research challenges, we 
propose to leverage the Selective Sobel Convolution (SSC) 
technique to enhance the robustness of a DNN against the 
adversarial attacks. In summary, we make the following novel 
contributions in this paper: 
1) SSCNets (III): We propose to integrate a sobel convolution-
based trainable layer at the input of the DNN, and jointly 
learn a defense strategy. 
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL 
ATTACKS 
In this section, we provide a brief explanation of the adversarial 
examples and the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms.   
A. Adversarial Examples: 
Adversarial examples are usually small and invisible 
perturbation in the input from adversary to manipulate the ML-
based classification to perform the targeted or un-targeted 
attacks on a DNN. The imperceptibility and strength of these 
attack are high dependent on their optimization function, 
therefore, based on their attack strategies. These approaches can 
be categorized as follows: 
1) Gradient-Based Attacks 
These attacks generate the adversarial noise based on the 
gradient of the loss function with respect to the corresponding 
parts of the input images/samples. Some of the most commonly 
used gradient-based attacks are Fast Gradient Sign Method 
(FGSM) [2], Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [3], Basic 
Iterative Method (BIM) [4], Carlini-Wagner Attacks (CW) [5] 
and DeepFool [6]. FGSM works by finding the perturbations 
that maximize the cost function for a specific input. JSMA 
attacks work by adding perturbations to only those pixels in the 
input image which have a large saliency score. Bit-iterative 
Method continuously performs FGSM attack but clips the 
perturbation to reduce perceptibility. CW attacks proposed by 
Carlini and Wagner are the most powerful attacks to date with 
three modifications, utilizing L0, L2, … Ln. 
2) Decision Based Attacks 
Unlike Gradient-based Attacks, Decision Based attacks do 
not require the calculation or estimation of gradients of loss. 
Instead, they utilize the class decision of the model in order to 
introduce the perturbation in the input image. Examples include 
Point-wise Attack [7] and Additive Gaussian Noise Attack [7]. 
3) Score Based Attacks 
These attacks analyze the statistical or probabilistic behavior of 
the individual input fragrances to estimate the corresponding 
gradients with respect to loss function. Some of the commonly 
used attacks are Single-Pixel Attack [8] and Local Search 
Attack [8]. 
B. Defenses 
Adversarial attacks are one of the major security vulnerabilities 
in ML-based application. Therefore, to improve and ensure the 
security of ML-based applications several defense strategies 
have been proposed based on the DNN masking [11] [14], 
gradient masking [10], training for known adversarial attacks 
[9] [12] and quantization of input of the DNNs [11] [14].  
One of the most common approach is to train the DNNs for 
the adversarial attacks. For example, adversarial learning trains 
the DNN based on the known adversarial examples but it limits 
its scope to known adversarial attack. Similarly based on the 
similar concept, Adversarial Perturbation Elimination using 
GANs (APE-GAN) has been proposed. This technique considers 
each input sample as a potential adversarial example retrain the 
network to remove the imperceptible noises. However, by 
introducing relatively stronger adversarial noise at which APE-
GAN is trained can break this defense mechanism. 
Another approach is to either mask the gradient or the whole 
DNN, e.g., Defensive Distillation masks the gradient of the 
network, but it is only valid for gradient-based attacks and it 
can be compromised by empirically inferring the gradient by 
applying different loss functions [15]. To address this issue, 
several techniques have been proposed to mask the entire DNN 
to limits the leakage of empirical information. For the activation 
function can be exploited to avoid small perturbations, i.e., 
Bounded Relu and Gaussian Data Augmentation 
(BReLU+GDA) [13]. 
Another approach for hardening the DNNs is based upon 
the quantization. Weilen Xu et al. proposed Feature Squeezing 
[17]. The main idea is to decrease the input space ultimately 
making the DNN robust to small perturbations in the input. 
III. SELECTIVE SOBEL CONVOLUTION-BASED DEFENSE FOR 
DNN  
In this section, we discuss our proposed methodology that 
leverages the Selective Sobel Convolution (SSC) technique to 
enhance the robustness of a DNN against the adversarial attacks. 
The proposed methodology, depicted in Fig. 2, consists of the 
following steps: 
A. Composing the SSCNets 
In this phase, we pick a DNN model and append its input with 
the Selective Sobel Convolutional (SSC) layer. We call this 
combined DNN as SSCNets. The role of SSC layer is two folds: 
first, it extracts all the edges in an input image using sobel mask. 
Second, it learns to eliminate the weaker edges found in the 
output of the Sobel convolution based on a tunable threshold, tk. 
In doing so, only the important edges are fed into the subsequent 
DNN model. Therefore, providing the features in a controlled 
fashion to the DNN model.  We formally explain the complete 
procedure in the following. 
1. Let us assume a color image scenario in which the input 
image has 3 layers, denoted as, 
𝒙 =  [𝑥(0), 𝑥(1), 𝑥(2)]                                                  (1) 
Here x(k) denotes the kth layer of the input x. 
2. We define the sobel mask as follows, 
𝒔 = [𝑠(0), 𝑠(1), 𝑠(2)]                                                   (2) 
Here s(k) denotes the kth layer of the sobel mask. Also, in 
our case, 𝑠(0) = 𝑠(1) = 𝑠(2) 
3. The Sobel Convolutional (SC) mask is applied over the 
input x, 
𝒆 = 𝒙 ∗ 𝒔                                                           (3) 
Here, e is the image with “Sobel Edges”. Also note that e 
is the 2-D gray-scale image.  
4. A tunable threshold tk is defined, which is updated on each 
iteration during the training phase to eliminate the weaker 
edges from the input image.  
ɛ𝑙,𝑘 =
1
1 + 𝑒−5×(𝑒𝑙,𝑘−𝑡𝑘)
× 𝑒𝑙,𝑘                                     (4) 
here, l and k are the indices of the pixel in e, ɛ is strong-
edge image and tk is the tunable threshold. 
5. We get a saturated strong-edge image ɛ, which is then 
multiplied with e to get the exact strength of the strong 
edges in the original input image. The output is then 
multiplied with the input image to retain the color 
information.  
𝛔 = M(𝛆, 𝐞)                                                     (5) 
𝐲 = M(𝐱, 𝛔)                                                    (6) 
Here the function, M(a, b) denotes the bit-wise 
multiplication operation between a and b. 
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Fig. 2 Proposed Methodology to design SSCNets. 
B. Training the Selective Sobel Convolution Layer 
In the SSCNets training phase, the threshold tk is updated, along 
with the other common DNN parameters, based on the loss 
function (we assume mean square error function for 
mathematical calculations and derivations) as defined below:  
cost =  
1
2
×∑(𝒗− 𝒗𝒂𝒄𝒄)
2                                          (7) 
where, v denotes the output probability vector of the input image 
and vacc denotes the vector containing actual accurate 
probabilities. 
To minimize the above loss function, we find the gradient of cost 
with respect to the thresholds and update the values of the 
thresholds as: 
tnew = told − η
∂ (cost)
∂ told
                                           (8) 
Let x denote the input image and y denote the corresponding 
output image of SSC layer, then by chain rule: 
∂ (cost)
∂ tk,old
= 
∂ (cost)
∂ y
×
∂ (y)
∂ tk,old
                                        (9) 
To calculate 
𝜕 (𝑦)
𝜕 𝑡𝑘,𝑜𝑙𝑑
, we proceed as follows:  
∂ (y)
∂ told
= 
∂ (y)
∂ σ
×
∂ (σ)
∂ ε
×
∂ (ε)
∂ told
                                        (10) 
∂ (y)
∂ told
= (∑ xa
a in x
) × (∑ eb
b in e
)
× (∑(−5)(εc)(1 − εc)
c in ε
)                                               (11) 
Here, xa, eb and ɛc denote one pixel instances of x, e and ɛ, 
respectively. The other term in equation (9) can be calculated 
using the following equation:  
∂ (cost)
∂ yk
= ∑wnkδn
all n
= ∆k                                               (12) 
Here, yk is the one pixel instance of y and 𝛿𝑘  denotes the 
sensitivity of yk for all the variables in the first convolutional 
layer of the DNN defined by the back propagation. Plugging in 
Equation 12 in Equation 9, it becomes:  
𝜕 (𝑐𝑜𝑠 )
𝜕  𝑘,𝑜𝑙𝑑
=  ( ∑ ∆𝑘
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑦
) × ( ∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝑥
) × ( ∑ 𝑒𝑏
𝑏 𝑖𝑛 𝑒
)
× (∑ (−5)( 𝑐)(1 −  𝑐)
𝑐 𝑖𝑛 𝜀
)                                              (13) 
Putting Equation 13 in Equation 8, we get the update equation 
for tk as: 
 𝑘,𝑛𝑒𝑤 =  𝑘,𝑜𝑙𝑑 − 𝜂 × ( ∑ ∆𝑘
𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑦
) × ( ∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝑥
) × ( ∑ 𝑒𝑏
𝑏 𝑖𝑛 𝑒
)
× (∑ (−5)( 𝑐)(1 −  𝑐)
𝑐 𝑖𝑛 𝜀
)                                             (14) 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To show the advantages of the SSCNets, we integrated the SSC 
layer into the commonly-used CNN baseline structure from                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
the open-source Cleverhans library, and performed extensive 
analysis. The description of our Experimental Setup is as 
follows (see Fig. 4):  
• CNN: We use the CNN structure from the Cleverhans library, 
i.e., Conv2D(64, 8x8) - Conv2D(128, 6x6) - Conv2D(128, 
5x5)  - Dense(10) - Softmax(). 
• Dataset: We trained and tested the above CNN structure for 
MNIST and CIFAR10 with experimental parameters given in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Experimental parameters for CNN training and 
testing 
Parameters Value 
No. of epochs 6 -10 
Number of Images in Test 
Dataset 
10000 
Batch Size 128 
Learning Rate 0.001 
 
Adversarial Attack: We evaluate our model for the state-of-
the-art adversarial attacks like FGSM, JSMA, and CW-L2.  
Threat Model: 
a) White box, where the adversary knows about the defensive 
layers and all the system parameters and structure, but is 
not authorized to change these parameters. 
 
Figure 3 Black Box and White Box Threat Models 
b) Black box, where the adversary does not know about our 
defensive layers or network parameters and structure. 
In both cases, we do not allow the adversary to effect the 
training of SSCNet. Further, the adversary is assumed to have 
the complete control over the inputs in both cases. 
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Figure 4 Experimental analysis of SSCNets against multiple 
attacks from Cleverhans for MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. 
A. Experimental Analysis 
This section provides the detailed analysis of the SSCNets 
against the implemented adversarial attacks. 
1) Increased Perceptibility of Adversarial Examples 
Adversarial examples are alarmingly indifferent to the 
human eye, compared to the legitimate examples [1] [2]. Figures 
1 and 5 show the minimum perturbation required for the targeted 
misclassification of an image. As shown, Controlled Training of 
the DNNs tends to reduce this imperceptibility. The reason for 
this reduced imperceptibility is the insensitivity of the DNN to 
both small and local perturbations. 
Further, in Figure 5, we observe that adversarial noise for the 
DNNs trained in a controlled environment tends to lie at the 
edges. This is justifiable, as the SSC layer tends to force the 
DNN to make decisions largely due to the (strong) edge 
information. Effectively, the SSC layer is reducing the 
adversarial openings of the DNNs, hence, reducing the 
adversary’s freedom of choice. 
 
Figure 5 Comparison of the adversarial examples for a DNN 
trained in an uncontrolled environment (left) vs. the same DNN 
trained in the controlled environment (right). 
V. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART DEFENSE 
MECHANISMS 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed defense 
mechanism, in this section, we present a comparison with state-
of-the-art defense mechanisms like Feature Squeezing and 
BRELU+GDA. 
Fig. 6 reports the results of FGSM attacks against Feature 
Squeezing [11], BReLU [13] and SSCNets on the MNIST 
datasets. Adversarial Accuracy captures the accuracy of the 
respective DNN models on the adversarial examples. SSCNet 
seems to show a slight decrease in the clean accuracy (from 
99.22% to 97,64%) of MNIST datasets. However, SSCNet 
outperforms BReLU and Feature Squeezing for the white-box 
scenario.  
Fig.7 reports the results of FGSM attack for the CIFAR10 
dataset. We observe a slight decrease in the clean accuracy 
(from 62.43% to 57.14%), however, SSCNets show promising 
results (from 8.87% to 34.34%. Feature Squeezing gives 21% 
while BReLU scores the highest accuracy of 35% for white-box 
FGSM threat model) against the white-box FGSM attacks on 
CIFAR10. The decreased clean accuracy is because of the 
controlled feeding of the inputs. The increase in the adversarial 
accuracy suggests that SSCNets are more robust to input 
changes. This is because the Selective Sobel Convolutional 
Layer eliminates the perturbations causing insignificant change 
in local edges. 
 
Figure 6 Accuracy on adversarial examples generated by FGSM 
for simple CNN vs. Controlled Training of SSCNets for the MNIST 
data set. 
 
Figure 7 Accuracy on adversarial examples generated by FGSM 
for simple CNN vs. Controlled Training of SSCNets for the 
CIFAR10 data set. 
 
Figure 8 Comparison of the proposed strategies with the state-of-
the-art defenses for (Targeted) CW-L2 attacks for MNIST and 
CIFAR10. No. of source samples for targeted CW-L2 attacks = 10, 
No. of iterations = 100. 
 
Figure 9 Comparison of the proposed strategies with the state-of-
the-art defenses for (Targeted) JSMA attack for MNIST and 
CIFAR10. No. of source samples = 10, No. of iterations = 100. 
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Fig.8 reports the results of Targeted CW-L2 attack on CIFAR10 
and MNIST datasets. The inferior performance on MNIST is 
because CW perturbations in the inputs causes additional edge 
information. This corrupted information is strong enough in 
case of MNIST to pass through the SSC layer and corrupt the 
decision. The adversarial training of SSCNets can considerably 
improve the results. Here, we emphasize that the accuracy of 
SSCNet on CIFAR10 for CW attacks is quite impressive. It is 
due to the fact that the selective edges in case of CIFAR10 
dataset are more significant than those introduced by the CW 
attack. 
Selective Sobel Convolution (SSC) seems to have the worst 
performance against JSMA attacks for MNIST. The reason is 
obvious: the adversary tries to successfully attack and perturb 
the edges, however, as shown in Figure 5, the perceptibility of 
the attacks is increased. This is in fact a great success because 
the perturbation that is too visible so as to change the inherent 
features of the image is less likely, often impractical. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed to integrate and learn a Selective 
Sobel Convolutional (SSC) inside a given DNN to increase its 
robustness against the adversarial attacks. It exploits the benefits 
of the controlled training to make the DNN robust against 
several state-of-the-art attacks. Although, it slightly reduces the 
clean accuracy of the DNN, it improves the overall robustness 
against small perturbations. It also reduces the imperceptibility 
of the adversarial examples generated by attacks, which is the 
main contribution of this methodology. 
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